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ABSTRACT  Using matched employer-employee data we examine firm-specific gender and 
ethnicity pay differentials in Britain. We estimate an econometric earnings model using the 
partially-observed pay variable provided in the data and test the normality assumption that 
underlies the usual interval regression technique. We then estimate alternative specifications 
allowing for firm-specific random effects, using a semi-parametric finite mixture estimator. The 
empirical estimation reveals a 22% (13%) weekly (hourly) gender pay gap and a 28% (19%) 
weekly (hourly) pay race gap. Strikingly, although significant and sizeable the firm-specific 
effects are not correlated with other variables that may act as indirect indicators of pay 
differentials.    
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1.  Introduction 
Ethnic and gender pay differentials have been heavily researched by labour 
economists. A common consensus is that both gender (Blau and Kahn, 2003; O’Neil and 
Polachek, 1993) and ethnic pay differentials (Chandra, 2003; Smith and Welch, 1989) have 
decreased over the last three decades. This decline is the result of many changes, including 
equal pay, anti-discrimination and affirmative action legislations (see Zabalza and Tzannatos, 
1985 for the UK and Donohue and Heckman, 1991 for the US).  
 There is evidence that gender pay differentials have also been affected by welfare 
reforms, incomes policies and changes in industrial structure, education and labour force 
participation and job mobility, fertility and family structure (Borooah and Lee, 1988; Goldin, 
2004; Goldin and Katz, 2000). Changes in the comparator male earnings distribution have 
also been important (Gosling et al., 2000). For ethnic minorities, convergence in years and 
quality of schooling has been found for recent cohorts in the US and in the UK (see Card and 
Krueger, 1992 and Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2006 respectively). Despite these relative 
gains, gender and the ethnicity pay gaps are remarkably persistent (Blau and Kahn, 2006; 
Darity and Nembhard, 2000).  
Nevertheless, there remains the difficulty that any differential reward to observed 
human capital variables (such as education) can be interpreted as either discrimination or as 
the result of differences in the unobserved correlates of these variables. Neal and Johnson 
(1996) have argued that controlling for pre-market skill levels largely accounts for the US 
black-white wage gap (see Lang and Manove, 2006 for a contrary view). Apart from human 
capital, other attributes such as non-cognitive skills (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001) and 





drawing a firm conclusion on discrimination is difficult because between-group productivity 
differentials cannot be observed (Altonji and Blank, 1999). For this reason, the pay gap is 
better labelled as “pay disadvantage” rather than as “pay discrimination” (Pudney and Shields 
2000).  
The above studies have all used datasets giving information only on the employee 
(individual or household data) or on the employer (plant or firm level data) despite the fact 
that labour market outcomes involve the matching of employees and employers. Matched 
employer-employee data make possible much more convincing evidence on discrimination 
(Hellerstein and Neumark, 2005). However, it is only recently that such datasets have become 
widely available (Hamermesh, 1999). Studies using linked employee-employer datasets 
(Abowd et al., 1999; Hellerstein et al., 1999; Meng, 2004) have found strong firm effects in 
explaining wage differentials, without linking these effects to gender and ethnicity. 
        In  this  paper,  we  examine  firm-specific gender and ethnicity pay differentials in 
Britain using matched employer-employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS98), which allows us to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and identify its role in determining pay differentials related to gender and ethnicity. 
Following Pudney (2000) and Cardoso (2000) we incorporate gender and ethnicity dummies, 
interacted with firm specific effects.  
    The paper is organised as follows. We begin in Section 2 by describing the matched 
survey data, and provide a measurement of pay. In Section 3 we present our model and 
propose two alternative tests checking normality. Section 4 explores a semi-parametric finite 
mixture random effects estimator that allows for the interaction of non-normal workplace 





results from the random effects specification. Section 6 uncovers firm-specific indicators of 
disadvantage at the workplace. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section seven.  
 
2.  The WERS98 data 
2.1  Survey design 
   WERS98 is the fourth in a series of industrial relations surveys that began in 1980, 
and is the first that includes workplaces with fewer than 25 employees or contains a matched 
survey of employees.  Interviews were conducted in 2,191 workplaces between October 1997 
and June 1998 with a plant-level response rate of 80%. Workplaces were sampled from the 
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). The sample is stratified by workplace 
employment size and industrial sector. It is nationally representative, but excludes agriculture 
and mining.  
We use information from two of the WERS98 questionnaires. The management 
questionnaire was implemented in a face-to-face interview with the most senior workplace 
manager with day-to-day responsibility for personnel matters. It gives information on the nature 
of the workplace, business conditions, product markets, union coverage, organisation and 
establishment and the composition of the labour force, particularly its occupational, gender and 
ethnic mix. The second element of our dataset is the employee survey, which was administered 
to 25 randomly-selected employees (or the whole workforce, where the establishment had fewer 
than 25 employees), using a self-completion questionnaire; 28,323 questionnaires were returned, 
giving a 64% response rate. The employee survey gives information on earnings, ethnicity, 





We use the subset of establishments and workers who supplied complete information on 
critical variables and we restrict attention to full-time employees (at least 30 hours per week). 
This results in a sample of 20,345 workers, linked to a set of 1,727 firms. Summary statistics are 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
2.2  Measurement of pay 
The wage information asked of respondents in the employee questionnaire relates to 
the following question: “How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other 
deductions are taken out? If your pay changes before tax from week to week because of 
overtime, or because you work different hours each week, think of what you earn on 
average”. Respondents were asked to place their pay level within 12 bands, chosen to 
approximate decile bands and the top and bottom 5% of the earnings distribution as estimated 
from the 1996 New Earnings Survey. The level of missing responses to this question was 1% 
(Cully et al., 1999). 
 Empirical work on the labour market usually uses the hourly wage rate as a measure 
of the return to labour. In fact, for many workers there is no such thing as the hourly wage. 
The employment relationship is very often a complex relationship in which there is a package 
of rewards and constraints accepted by the employee, rather than a simple constant unit price 
market for workers’ time. To investigate the robustness of our results to this issue, we use 
two alternative measures of the reward to labour. Our first measure of pay is the hourly wage, 
equal to ratio of weekly earnings to the number of working hours per week, including any 
overtime or extra hours.  The second measure is total weekly earnings, excluding bonuses or other non-
standard pay items. This can be justified under a different view of the employment relation 
and the underlying technology. Consider a stylised example. There is a sequence of 
production periods, each of length T, in which productive activity takes place. In each period, 
the employer requires a fixed set of activities, p, to be completed by the worker. Now 
suppose that the technology is sufficiently flexible that workers can deliver this contracted 
volume of activity at a rate and over a time span of their own choosing, provided it complies 
with the overall production timetable. Thus p can be decomposed as  p  =  t e, where t is time 
spent doing productive work during the production period and e is intensity of effort during 
time at work. The time T-t is used as on or off the job leisure or ‘social’ time. The employer 
is indifferent between alternative (t, e) combinations provided t ≤ T. The worker’s problem is 
then to choose a utility-maximising combination (t, e) subject to the constraints  p te =  and 
t≤T. Workers with different tastes will choose different (t, e) combinations. Hours of work 
are essentially meaningless here: respondents might report them either as t or as the 
conventional standard length of the work period T, even if actual activity time t is less than T. 
In any case, the relevant return to productive activity is measured appropriately by total 
payment per contracted task completed during the production period, p. This is reflected 
directly by weekly or annual earnings. On the other hand, pay per reported hour may be 
contaminated by confusions between t and T. 
 
 
3.   The econometric model 
3.1   The interval regression specification 
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where xih is a vector of observable covariates, ξ1ih = 1 if worker i,h is female and  ξ1ih = 0 
otherwise; ξ2ih is a similar dummy if worker i,h is a member of the ethnic minority group. The 
unobservable variable εih is the usual random disturbance term distributed with mean zero and 
unknown variance σ
2. In the hourly pay model, we retain log earnings as the dependent variable 
but include log working hours per week (including any overtime or extra hours) as a regressor, 
with its coefficient restricted to 1. 
The unobservable variable u0h is a general firm-specific wage premium; u1h and u2h are 
firm-specific gender and ethnicity wage differentials respectively. Conditional on xih, ξ1ih and 
ξ2ih, we treat u0h, u1h and u2h as random workplace effects, distributed randomly with unrestricted 
means and variances, subject to a mean-independence assumption E(xih,ujh)= 0 for j = 0, 1, 2. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, any individual is only observed with one employer, 
so unobserved individual heterogeneity cannot be identified and is consigned to the error term. 
The firm-specific random effect   captures unobserved firm effects common to all individuals 
at the establishment.    
oh u
There is a complication induced by the design of the WERS98 questionnaire, since the 
(log) wage wih is observed only within ranges. Let the observed pay interval for worker i, h be 
) , ( ih ih ih W W R =  and assume normality for the error term εih. Then the log-likelihood for this 
model is 
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where: 
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and  h ih h ih h ih ih u u u 2 2 1 1 0 0 ξ ξ β β λ + + + + = x  and Eu[ . ] denotes the expectation with respect to 
the random effects distribution. The implementation of this maximum likelihood (ML) estimator 
requires some method of approximating this expectation. 
 
3.2 Constant ethnicity and gender differentials   
       Let the means of u1h and u2h be μ1 and μ2. In that case, they can be treated as constant 
parameters to be estimated, with the dummy variables ξ1ih and ξ2ih absorbed into the vector 
x1ih. Define u1h
* = u1h - μ1 and u2h
* = u2h - μ2.  If we treat the composite variable vih = u0h
 + 
ξ1ih u1h
* + ξ2ih u2h
* as a residual and estimate equation (1) by Gaussian interval regression (IR) 
techniques, the resulting estimates may be inconsistent for two separate reasons: non-
normality and heteroskedasticity. Since the model is nonlinear, departures from normality of 
vih produce inconsistency. Secondly, the variance of the composite error vih + εih depends on 
gender and ethnicity, so the model is heteroskedastic. Again, the standard IR estimator is 
inconsistent under heteroskedasticity, whether or not the normality assumption is correct. To 
address these issues, we allow explicitly for the existence of between-firm variation in ethnic 








 3.3 The form of the pay distribution  
       The normality assumption often fails in the tails of the distribution (Chay and Honore, 
1998). We propose two new tests for non-normality in the IR model. The first examines the 
effect of aggregating a number of pay intervals at the top or bottom ends of the pay scale, 
using a likelihood-based technique. Re write the conditional probability of observing the jth 
pay interval as Pjih(θ) = Φ((Wj  - λih)/σ) - Φ((Wj-1 - λih)/σ) where θ is the parameter vector and 
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where yjih = 1 if wih is in the jth pay range and 0 if not. Consider a subset S of the pay ranges 
in the upper or lower tail of the pay distribution and decompose the likelihood element as: 
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where   if  W   1 = sih y ih ∈S and 0 otherwise.  
Note that the components   and   are both likelihoods in their own right and 
can be maximised separately to give alternative estimates of θ. We follow the approach of 
Ruud (1984) and test the specification of the model by carrying out a likelihood ratio test of 
H
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 where   and   are parameter vectors estimated by maximising the component likelihoods. 
Under the null hypothesis of correct specification, this is distributed as χ
* ˆ θ
* * ˆ θ
2 with degrees of 
freedom equal to the dimension of θ. Table 1 provides the estimated values of the above test 
statistic for the hourly and the weekly models and for different numbers of pay ranges. We 
reject the null hypothesis for all the bottom and top ranges.   
            Table 1.  ML tests for impact of aggregating tail pay ranges. 
 
Weekly pay  Hourly wage  Number of pay 
intervals aggregated  Bottom tail  Top tail  Bottom tail  Top tail 
7 986.7  9058.4  915.1  8040.1 
8 1131.  5  29641.4  1023.3  28014.0 
9 1174.9  949.3  1311.4  44926.1 
10 46571.9  60939.7  745.2  58105.9 
Note: all statistics are χ
2(59); 10%, 5% and 1% critical values are 73.28, 77.93 and 87.17. 
 
       The second test is based on the observation that the IR model is nested within the 
following ordered probit model: 
ih ih ih w υ γ + = x
*              (8) 
where  , υ σ /
*
ih ih w w = ih = vih /σ and γ = β / σ and σ is the standard deviation of vih. Then: 
) ( ) ( ) | Pr( 1 γ γ ih j ih j ih ih - C - C j y x x x − Φ − Φ = =      (9) 
where C0 ... Cm are fixed parameters normalised by C 0 = -∞, Cm = +∞. Then the following 
restrictions should be satisfied by the ordered probit model: 
( ) j j C W = − σ β / 0        ( 1 0 )  
These equalities can be tested with a likelihood ratio test (LR). For both the hourly and weekly 








                 Table 2.  LR tests of ordered probit against interval regression. 
 





1 Critical values 14.68, 16.92 and 21.67 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
             Figures 1 and 2 plot the left- and right-hand sides of equation (10) and show the 
nature of departures from normality. The main problem is the bottom tail of the conditional 
pay distribution, where the ordered probit results show that the upper limit of the bottom pay 
range would need to be shifted rightwards to capture the relatively large number of low-pay 
individuals. 
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4.  Semi-parametric random-effects estimation 
  The simple IR model is clearly not tenable empirically. We now explore a generalised 
approach that allows for the interaction of non-normal workplace effects with individual 
workers’ gender/ethnicity characteristics. 
 
4.1 The finite mixture approach 
  We use a semi-parametric finite mixture (FM) random-effects estimator based on the 
model (3)-(4). This approximates the distribution of the random effects uh by an arbitrary 
trivariate discrete distribution, where the location and magnitude of the probability mass 
points are treated as fixed parameters. Thus: 
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The mass points u
q are additional parameters. The probabilities π
q must be non-negative and 
















π       ( 1 2 )  
where ρ
1 is normalised to 0 and ρ
2 ... ρ
Q are free parameters. Note that distribution {  u } 
is degenerate unless some elements of the vectors u are equal. However, since the 
parameters space is not constrained with respect to the u , degeneracy is not being imposed 
on the distribution. An alternative specification would be to have a fixed set of mass points 
for each   and u  and then generate the u as their cartesian products. This would be a 
restricted version of our model and would have the disadvantage that for a given number of 





1 0,u u 2
q
The log-likelihood function (2) is maximised numerically for a sequence of 
specifications with different numbers of mass points Q (Figure 3). It is important to repeat the 
computational algorithm from a number of alternative starting points (five in this case), since 
there are known to be multiple optima in this class of likelihoods (see Laird, 1978; Heckman 
and Singer, 1984). 


































                                                
4.2 Results 
  We report results for the basic IR and FM models in Appendix Tables A2 and A3.  
The impact of individual ethnicity and gender was specified as follows. We started with a 
ten-category breakdown formed from the interaction of the two gender groups with five 
ethnic groups: Black (Afro-Caribbean and African); Indian; Pakistani, Bangladeshi, other 
(white European and others). In a simple IR model, the intercepts for these groups could be 
represented adequately by three dummy variables: females; ethnic minority and ethnic 
minority women. The restrictions embodied in this specification were accepted at the 5% 
level of significance despite the large sample size. Since there was virtually no difference 
between the restricted and unrestricted models in the estimates of other coefficients, this 
specification was judged to be acceptable. It is also particularly convenient since it allows us 
to work with a single disadvantaged racial group despite the heterogeneity of educational 
qualifications and labour market outcomes between Britain’s ethnic minority groups 
(Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2006).   
Job characteristics include eight dummy variables that capture broad occupational 
classification
1 according to the 1991 Standard Occupational Classification Guides (manager, 
professional, associate professional and technical, clerical and secretarial, craft and skilled 
service, personal and protective service, sales, plant and machine operatives, omitted 
category “other occupation” i.e. cleaner, postal worker). We also allow for trade union 
membership, having a temporary job status and years of tenure in the current job (seniority).  
 
1 It has long been argued whether one should include controls for occupational status in a study of 
discrimination since occupational differences may be caused by discrimination (Blau and Ferber, 1987). 
However, occupations are affected differentially by compensating wage differentials and efficiency wages (Bell 
and Ritchie, 1998). Thus, excluding occupation might lead to omitted variable bias. Other establishment attributes include: the size of the workforce (the log number of 
employees at the establishment), union density and its interaction with gender and ethnicity, 
the legal status of the establishment (public sector administration and its interaction with 
gender and private sector services; the omitted category is private sector manufacturing), 
being a multi-establishment (part of a larger organization, a 0/1 dummy), if the degree of 
competition in the market that the establishment operates is very high/high (a 0/1 dummy), 
and if the establishment supplies its goods and services to the local market (a 0/1 dummy). 
Additionally, we control for the region at which the establishment is located according to the 
standard statistical region classification by including four region specific dummy variables 
(London, Rest of the South East, West-Midlands and Scotland)
2 as well as two dummy 
variables coming from the management questionnaire and capturing different levels of the 
unemployment to vacancy rate by travel to work area.      
       Table A3 in the Appendix gives the results of the random effects wage equation for 
both the weekly and hourly specifications estimated using a likelihood based on the 
distribution of equation 3. The random effects model involves three establishment-specific 
unobservables: a general firm specific effect   a female firm specific effect  ; and an 
ethnic minority firm specific effect  . The coefficients are in general consistent in sign, 
significance and magnitude across the two specifications. We present the results 
simultaneously from the weekly and hourly specifications. 
; 0h u h u1
h u2
Besides gender, ethnicity and their interaction, other individual attributes in the model 






                                                 
2 Initial tests showed that the dummy variables for the other regions obtained an insignificant coefficient in both 
the weekly and hourly specifications and were excluded. Their exclusion did not have an impact on the 





profile has an inverse U-shape. Unmarried status and work-relevant health problems are both 
associated with a significant decrease in both weekly and hourly wages. Returns to 
educational attainment range from 6% for low education qualification (low CSE) to 22% for 
a university degree. A postgraduate degree has an incremental return of 26% for weekly 
wages and 17% for hourly wages. Vocational qualifications, such as a trade apprenticeship, 
NVQ, or a City and Guilds Certificate, are associated with a small but significant wage 
disadvantage of around 1%. There are large, significant occupational pay differentials, 
especially for the highest status jobs. To allow for the possibility that the return to educational 
qualifications might be reduced if the individual is denied access to an appropriate 
occupation, we include interactions between education and occupation. These are significant, 
particularly for degree and managerial/professional (15%), A-level or above and technical 
(7%) and high CSE or above and services (5%). Within the sales occupation, low educational 
attainment brings a significant disadvantage (-11%). We find that female skilled employees 
enjoy a higher skill premium than skilled men (see also Groshen, 1991).  
Workforce composition variables capture the profile of the stock of workers 
employed by the establishment, in terms of gender, ethnicity and their interactions with the 
gender and ethnicity dummy variables respectively. We also control for the proportion of 
each occupational group at the establishment, the proportion of part-time employees, and 
proportions of staff over 50 and under 21 years of age. We find that the higher the percentage 
of female and ethnic minority employees at the establishment the lower is pay for all 
employees. Although the coefficient of the percentage of female employees is negative, its 
interaction with the female is positive and significant. Thus female employees experience less 





working in female-dominated establishments do less well than other men. One interpretation 
of this is that bargaining power for women is higher in establishments where women are 
overrepresented. Another interpretation is that women are attracted to employers who do not 
discriminate. In contrast, the corresponding interaction term for ethnic minority employees is 
negative, implying that ethnic minority employees face greater disadvantage in 
establishments with a high density of ethnic minority employees. The opposite results found 
for these individual-firm interactions for gender and ethnicity conflict with explanations 
based on bargaining power or supply-driven segregation. If a concentration of women in a 
workplace increases women’s power to oppose discrimination or is a signal of a lack of 
discrimination, then why does not the same mechanism work for ethnic minorities? Our view 
is that these results reflect an important distinction: that women are a large, widely-dispersed 
group, whereas ethnic minorities are small, locally-concentrated and less integrated in wider 
society. For a member of an ethnic minority, working in a minority-dominated establishment 
may be a symptom of weak integration and poor access to the opportunities offered by wider 
society. The poor outside option counteracts the bargaining power that a large group of 
workers might otherwise have. 
       We  find  a  significant  relationship between the occupational profile of an 
establishment and its wage-setting behaviour: establishments employing a high proportion of 
managerial, professional and skilled staff tend to be high-wages employers, whereas 
workplaces employing high proportions of part-time, young, and old staff tend to pay 
relatively low wages.  
Union density within the workplace has a small but significant positive effect for both 





hourly wages for female employees are lower in establishments with high levels of union 
density. The interaction effect of ethnicity and union density is positive and significant in 
both specifications (see Blau and Kahn, 1996).         
Firm size has a positive influence on wages. The business conditions faced by the 
employer also play a significant role. Establishments whose main product market is local 
rather than regional, national or international, are associated with generally lower levels of 
pay. Being part of a large firm (multi-establishment) increases both weekly and hourly pay by 
4.6% and 3.4% correspondingly. There is also evidence of rent sharing, with highly 
competitive product market conditions implying slightly lower wage levels of about 1.6% for 
weekly wages and 2.6% for hourly wages. These are features that are shared with most other 
studies (see Blanchflower et al., 1996; Hellerstein et al., 2002; Troske, 1999).  
Working in the public sector (administration) involves a significant pay disadvantage 
of 7.4% for weekly wages and 6.8% for hourly wages. However, the interaction dummy 
between a public sector establishment and being female is positive and significant. This 
implies that there is a positive return to working in the public sector for women, possibly 
reflecting more effective equal pay policies.  
We find significant regional differences. Both weekly and hourly earnings are highest 
in London, the South East, West Midlands and (hourly earnings only) Scotland. Local labour 
market conditions are also significant, with high unemployment to vacancies ratios reducing 
expected earnings at the level of travel to work area. 
 
 
 5. The random effects distribution 
Our final specification is a 9-point trivariate discrete distribution for the establishment 
effects.
3 The specification was determined by means of likelihood ratio criteria. We reject the 
specifications of 10 and 11 mass points in favour of 9 mass points for both models (see also 
Figure 3). The computed χ
2 for the weekly random effects model between 9 and 10 mass 
points is 3.45 (4 degrees of freedom) and between 9 and 11 mass points is 4.49 (8 degrees of 
freedom). Similarly, for the hourly specification, the χ
2  statistics were 2.42 and 4.83 
respectively.      
The implied means, standard deviations and correlations of the three establishment 
effects   for the weekly and the hourly regressions are given in Table 3.  h h h u u u 2 1 0 , ,
  Table 3. Wage equations: semi-parametric random effects. 
PARAMETER  WEEKLY REGRESSION  HOURLY REGRESSION 










































  Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  






3 Estimation was done in GAUSS using the MAXLIK procedure. Since WERS98 is a stratified two-stage 
probability sample we also carried out a weighted estimation of the above specification by including into the 
estimation the establishment weight. The changes in the magnitude of the coefficients were very moderate, and 
the standard errors very close or the same with those obtained from the semi-parametric random effects 
estimation.        The means for gender and race firm specific effects are different, especially for the 
weekly regression, where the means imply an average pay disadvantage of 22% for women 
and a 16% pay disadvantage for ethnic minorities. Our estimated gender pay gap is as high as 
that reported by Harkness (1996) and slightly higher than the 21% disadvantage reported by 
Mumford and Smith (2004) who use the same dataset as in this study.   
However, the positive coefficient estimated for the interaction dummy variable of 
being female and member of an ethnic minority group (10%, see Table A3 in the Appendix) 
implies that the ethnic minority females face an average pay disadvantage of roughly 28% 
rather than the 38% that would otherwise be implied. In other words, pay differentials are on 
average 22% for ethnic minority men but only 6% for ethnic minority women.
4  
       The variances of the firm effects in the weekly regression are highly significant. The 
variance of the general firm effects is roughly double the variance of the gender and ethnicity 
effects. The significant negative correlation  01 ˆ ρ  implies that high-wage firms tend to pay low 
female weekly wages. However, the correlations between the general firm effect and 
ethnicity wage premium ( 02 ˆ ρ ), and between the female wage premium and the ethnicity 
wage premium ( 12 ˆ ρ ) are insignificant.  
            On an hourly pay basis, ethnic pay differentials are on average 13% for ethnic 
minority men and 6% for ethnic minority women. The finding for males closely mirrors the 
11% male wage differential found in the UK in the 1990s by Blackaby et al. (2002). The 
estimated variances and correlations of the firm effects are similar to those in the weekly 
earnings model. 






4 Bronars and Famulari (1997) using US matched employer-employee data (Bureau of Labor Statistics White 
Collar Pay Survey, 1989-1990) find a monthly wage gap of 27.5% between white and black full-time private 






We restrict this analysis to establishments in which there was at least one employee 
recorded and a positive percentage of women and/or ethnic minority employees who 
responded to the survey, giving a subsample of 1,715 firms.  
6. Firm-specific indicators of disadvantage 
The posterior distribution of u conditional on the observed variables relevant to 
establishment h is given by: 
) , | Pr(
) ( ) , , | Pr(
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where yh = {y1h y2h ... },  Xh = {x1h x2h ... }, Ξh = {ξ11h ξ21h , ξ12h ξ22h , ...  }. The mean of this 
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Our aim here is to uncover indirect indicators of disadvantage at the workplace by 
investigating the empirical relationship between u ,   and u , and a range of variables 
relating to employees’ perceptions about managers and working conditions (Table 4) and 
employer’s policies/practices and the establishment’s performance (Table 5). These variables 
were not included in the econometric specification as they are potentially endogenous. 
However, they can be used post-estimation to shed light on the firm-specific unobservables 
 and  . If these are clearly related to other observable indicators of the firm’s attitude 
towards equal opportunities, this would provide some support for an interpretation in terms of 
employers’ tastes for discrimination. 
     (16) 
 Table 4. Correlations between the estimated means of the three firm specific effects and variables of interest from the employee questionnaire.   
    WEEKLY HOURLY 
    General Gender  Ethnic  General Gender  Ethnic 











Responses  h u0 ˆ   No. of 
Responses  h u1 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u2 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u0 ˆ   No. of 
responses 
No. of 
h u1 ˆ  
Responses  h u2 ˆ  
Employees who say that 
managers are poor/very poor in 
treating them fairly  
y=0 
y=1 
  1338 











  1338 




  144 
-0.132 
-0.132 
320  -0.148 
  15  -0.155 
Employees who say that 
managers are poor/very poor in 
dealing with work problems 
that employees may have  
y=0 
y=1 
   1297 











   1297 




  176 
-0.133 
-0.130 
319  -0.148 
  16  -0.157 
Employees who 
disagree/strongly disagree that 
they share many of the values 
of their organization  
y=0 
y=1 
  1459 








    8 
-0.163 
-0.164 
  1459 




  105 
-0.133 
-0.120 
327  -0.148 
   8  -0.149 
Employees who 
disagree/strongly disagree that 




  1335 











  1335 




  146 
-0.133 
-0.128 
320  -0.149 
  15  -0.139 
Employees who think that the 
job at the workplace that 
personally do is done 
only/mainly by men 
y=0 
y=1 
  1099 








  10 
-0.163 
-0.164 
  1099 




     47 
-0.132 
-0.129 
325  -0.148 
  10  -0.150 
Employees who think that the 
job at the workplace that 
personally do is done equally 
by men and women 
y=0 
y=1 
  1154 











  1154 




   268 
-0.132 
-0.133 
311  -0.147 
  24  -0.157 
Employees who think that the 
job at the workplace that 
personally do is done 
only/mainly by women 
y=0 
y=1 
   1177 











  1177 




   484 
-0.134 
-0.129 
321  -0.149 






Table 5. Correlations between the estimated means of the three firm specific effects and variables of interest from the management questionnaire.  
 
   Weekly  Hourly 
   General  Gender  Ethnic  General  Gender  Ethnic 
Variables  Binary 
outcome 
No. of 
responses  h u0 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u1 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u2 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u0 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u1 ˆ   No. of 
responses  h u2 ˆ  
If there is a formal written policy on 
equal opportunities or managing 
diversity policy have you tried to 
measure the effects of equal 
opportunities policies on the 

























   357 
-0.145 
-0.146 
Managers who assess that labour 
productivity at the establishment is 
a lot better/better than average 
compared with other establishments 



























If tribunal application in last year 
how many complaints were made in 
























  352 
-0.144 
-0.149 
If tribunal application in last year 

























    55 
-0.145 
-0.147 
If tribunal application in last year 

























    47 
-0.145 
-0.147 
Grievance on sex or race 
discrimination raised in the past 





















-0.145  1601 
  114  0.429  -0.146   Tables 4 and 5 both show very small differences between the mean values of    and 
 between groups of firms categorised by variables representing employees’ perceptions, 
or workplace conditions, practices and performance. The differences turn out to be so small 
that there is no need to construct formal hypothesis tests to assess their statistical 
significance. The finding of no association between estimated firm-specific gender and ethnic 
pay differentials is striking. It makes it difficult to sustain an interpretation of the econometric 
results as a reflection of explicit discriminatory practices and suggests instead more subtle 




7.  Conclusions 
This is the first British study that uses matched employer employee data and examines 
the role of firm specific effects in shaping gender and ethnicity pay differentials. We find robust 
evidence in support of significant pay differentials between men and women and between 
white and non-white employees. The empirical estimation reveals a 22% weekly gender pay 
gap and a 28% weekly race pay gap. The corresponding hourly estimates are 13% and 19%. We 
also show that the inclusion of unobserved establishment heterogeneity in a conventional 
human capital based earnings function adds an important feature to the determinants of 
wages. For instance, we find strong evidence that high wage firms tend to pay low female 
wages.  
    Another contribution of the paper in the applied econometrics literature is that we 
propose two alternative tests and show that the maintained hypotheses of normality in the 
widely-used Interval Regression model is not tenable empirically. Thus, using a semi-parametric 










problems by allowing for the interaction of non-normal workplace effects with individual 
workers’ gender/ethnicity characteristics.  
Calculating the posterior distribution of the firm specific unobservable variables and 
investigating their relationship with other variables that may act as indirect indicators of 
discrimination, we find no significant relationship. Thus, it is very difficult to reach any clear 
conclusions about the source of inter-firm variations in pay differentials or the corresponding 
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Table A1. Sample properties of variables (Weighted N=20,345). 
VARIABLE MEAN  VARIABLE  MEAN  VARIABLE  MEAN 




Female percentage  48.242 
(1.174) 




Female percentage & female  21.777 
(0.681) 
Working hours per week  42.677 
(0.137) 
Service occupation  0.059 
(0.007) 
Trade union density  0.264 
(0.013) 




Minority &  union density  0.012 
(0.001) 
















Sale & CSE   0.010 
(0.001) 
Private sector (services)  0.545 
(0.018) 
Ethnic minority woman  0.012 
(0.002) 
Service & (GCSE or 
Alevel or Degree) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
Female & public sector  0.134 
(0.006) 
Ethnic minority man  0.016 
(0.001) 




Competitive firm  0.584 
(0.017) 
Ethnic majority man  0.619 
(0.009) 
Professional staff or 
manager & Degree  
0.112 
(0.005) 
Ln (Size of firm)  3.675 
(0.025) 
Ethnic majority woman  0.353 
(0.008) 
Proportion part-time  0.192 
(0.008) 
Part of a large firm  0.691 
(0.023) 
Low school qualification (CSE)  0.122 
(0.004) 
Proportion managerial  0.112 
(0.005) 
Market local  0.308 
(0.019) 
High school qualification (GCSE)  0.248 
(0.005) 








Proportion technical  0.074 
(0.008) 




Proportion clerical  0.194 
(0.009) 
West Midlands  0.010 
(0.016) 
Postgraduate degree  0.062 
(0.003) 




Vocational qualification  0.404 
(0.006) 
Proportion sales staff  0.081 
(0.006) 
Banded total 
unemployment/vacancy rate by 
travel to work area (3%-6%) 
0.667 
(0.023) 
Health problem  0.061 
(0.003) 
Proportion services staff   0.075 
(0.007) 
Banded total unemployment/ 
vacancy rate by travel to work 





Proportion over 50  0.152 
(0.006) 






Proportion under 21  0.051 
(0.003) 






Minority percentage  4.136 
(0.288) 





















Table A2. Non-heterogeneous interval regression results (robust standard errors). 
WEEKLY PAY  HOURLY PAY 
COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR  COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR 
Tenure/10 0.063***  0.0051  Tenure/10 0.070***  0.0051 
Temporary Job  -0.091***  0.0176  Temporary Job  -0.073***  0.0173 
Age 0.503***  0.0174  Age 0.466***  0.0167 
(Age/10)^2 -0.055***  0.0020  (Age/10)^2 -0.050***  0.0019 
Unmarried -0.086***  0.0056  Unmarried -0.079***  0.0056 
Trade union member  0.065***  0.0069  Trade union member  0.054***  0.0068 
Low school qualification (Low 
CSE) 
0.053***  0.0088  Low school qualification (Low 
CSE) 
0.054*** 0.0087 
High school qualification (High 
CSE) 
0.119***  0.0077  High school qualification (High 
CSE) 
0.116*** 0.0076 
Intermediate school qualification 
(A level) 
0.153*** 0.0088  Intermediate  school  qualification 
(A level) 
0.151*** 0.0087 
University degree  0.212***  0.0130  University degree  0.202***  0.0127 
Postgraduate degree  0.404***  0.0136  Postgraduate degree  0.344***  0.0134 
Vocational qualification  -0.016***  0.0049  Vocational qualification  -0.014***  0.0049 
Health problem  -0.040***  0.0098  Health problem  -0.030***  0.0093 
Female   -0.226***  0.0161  Female   -0.129***  0.0158 
Minority -0.161***  0.0275  Minority -0.132***  0.0272 
Ethnic minority woman  0.091***  0.0260  Ethnic minority woman  0.087***  0.0244 
Managerial 0.581***  0.0135  Managerial 0.512***  0.0131 
Professional 0.429***  0.0145  Professional 0.407***  0.0141 
Technical 0.265***  0.0152  Technical 0.284***  0.0151 
Clerical 0.096***  0.0143  Clerical 0.132***  0.0137 
Craft (skilled manual)  0.162***  0.0130  Craft (skilled manual)  0.150***  0.0128 
Service occupation  0.165***  0.0280  Service occupation  0.157***  0.0321 
Sales   0.191***  0.0221  Sales   0.192***  0.0202 
Operative 0.036***  0.0130  Operative  0.015  0.0130 
Professional or managerial & 
degree 
0.145***  0.0143  Professional or managerial & 
degree 
0.112*** 0.0142 
Technical & (alevel or degree)  0.078***  0.0152  Technical & (alevel or degree)  0.074***  0.0153 
Service & (highcse or, alevel or, 
degree) 
0.102***  0.0293  Service & (highcse or, alevel or, 
degree) 
0.084*** 0.0316 
Sales & low CSE  -0.142***  0.0329  Sales & low CSE  -0.091***  0.0308 
Female and skilled  0.038***  0.0112  Female and skilled  0.036***  0.0110 
Percentage of female & female  0.0009***  0.0003  Percentage of female & female  0.0006**  0.0002 
Percentage of females  -0.0024***  0.0003  Percentage of females  -0.0014***  0.0003 
Percentage of ethnic minority & 
minority 
-0.0017**  0.0079  Percentage of ethnic minority & 
minority 
-0.0023*** 0.0007 
Percentage of minorities  -0.0009*  0.0005  Percentage of minorities  -0.0005  0.0005 
Proportion part-time staff  -0.237***  0.0321  Proportion part-time staff  -0.219***  0.0310 
Proportion managerial staff  0.195***  0.0421  Proportion managerial staff  0.256***  0.0411 
Proportion professional staff  0.186***  0.0264  Proportion professional staff  0.224***  0.0267 
Proportion technical staff  0.098***  0.0253  Proportion technical staff  0.192***  0.0267 
Proportion clerical staff  0.225***  0.0249  Proportion clerical staff  0.310***  0.0253 
Proportion craft (skilled) staff   0.037  0.0241  Proportion craft (skilled) staff   0.091***  0.0258 
Proportion service staff  0.103***  0.0299  Proportion service staff  0.141***  0.0322 
Proportion sales staff  0.216***  0.0326  Proportion sales staff  0.267***  0.3300 
Proportion staff over 50  -0.227***  0.0416  Proportion staff over 50  -0.171***  0.0420 
Proportion staff under 21  -0.374***  0.0669  Proportion staff under 21  -0.395***  0.0595 
Ln(employment) 0.030***  0.0032  Ln(employment)  0.0336***  0.0033 
Continued 
 Table A2. Non-heterogeneous interval regression results (robust standard errors). 
Continued 
WEEKLY PAY  HOURLY PAY 
COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR  COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR 
Union density  0.045**  0.0178  Union density  0.110***  0.0188 
Female & trade union density  -0.008  0.0185  Female & trade union density  -0.053***  0.0184 
Minority & trade union density  0.093**  0.0400  Minority & trade union density  0.071*  0.0384 
Public sector (administration)  -0.097***  0.0167  Public sector (administration)  -0.106***  0.0166 
Female & public sector  0.037***  0.0122  Female & public sector  0.018  0.0124 
Private sector (service)  -0.029**  0.0132  Private sector (service)  -0.051***  0.0135 
Part of large firm  0.025  0.0119  Part of large firm  0.026**  0.0122 
Local product market  -0.029***  0.0096  Local product market  -0.023**  0.0098 
Highly competitive market  -0.020**  0.0091  Highly competitive market  -0.033***  0.0092 
London 0.219***  0.0148  London 0.217***  0.0152 
Rest of the South East  0.089***  0.0105  Rest of the South East  0.086***  0.0112 
West-Midlands   0.040***  0.0139  West-Midlands   0.036***  0.0141 
Scotland 0.186  0.0131  Scotland  0.040***  0.0125 
Banded total unemployment 
vacancy rate by travel to work 
area (3%-6%) 
-0.052***  0.0101  Banded total unemployment 
vacancy rate by travel to work 
area (3%-6%) 
-0.050*** 0.0102 
Banded total unemployment 
vacancy rate by travel to work 
area (more than 7%) 
-0.078***  0.0161  Banded total unemployment 
vacancy rate by travel to work 
area (more than 7%) 
-0.065*** 0.0171 
Constant 4.176***  0.0484  Constant 0.380***  0.0453 
Sigma -1.262***  0.0094  Sigma -1.271***  0.0097 
Llog=-35549.694  Wald chi2(59)=16970.47  Llog=-35279.004  Wald chi2(59)=13570.85 
N=20345  Prob>chi2=0.0000  N=20345  Prob>chi2=0.0000 
Note: *,**,***, 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance correspondingly. The results are obtained by estimating 
equation 2,  ih h ih h ih h ih ih u u u w ε ξ ξ β + + + + + = 2 2 1 1 0 0 β x  as a standard IR model. The dummy variables 
ih 1 ξ  and  ih 2 ξ  are absorbed into the vector of observable characteristics   and we treat the composite error 
term v
ih x























Table A3. Semi-parametric random effects results (robust standard errors).     
    WEEKLY PAY  HOURLY PAY 
COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR  COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR 
Tenure/10 0.063***  0.0041  Tenure/10 0.065***  0.0041 
Temporary Job  -0.085***  0.0123  Temporary Job  -0.072***  0.0124 
Age 0.491***  0.0115  Age 0.445***  0.0116 
(Age/10)^2 -0.053***  0.0014  (Age/10)^2 -0.048***  0.0014 
Unmarried -0.072***  0.0056  Unmarried -0.066***  0.0057 
Trade union member  0.059***  0.0048  Trade union member  0.046***  0.0049 
Low school qualification (Low 
CSE) 
0.056*** 0.0081  Low  school  qualification 
(Low CSE) 
0.057*** 0.0079 
High school qualification 
(High CSE)  





0.151*** 0.0081  Intermediate  school 
qualification (Alevel) 
0.146*** 0.0081 
University degree  0.196***  0.0104  University degree  0.185***  0.0102 
Postgraduate degree  0.392***  0.0099  Postgraduate degree  0.330***  0.0099 
Vocational qualification  -0.012***  0.0041  Vocational qualification  -0.013***  0.0040 
Health problem  -0.031***  0.0092  Health problem  -0.027***  0.0090 
Ethnic minority woman  0.096***  0.0261  Ethnic minority woman  0.080***  0.0247 
Managerial 0.569***  0.0087  Managerial 0.498***  0.0087 
Professional 0.417***  0.0090  Professional 0.394***  0.0090 
Technical 0.247***  0.0116  Technical 0.261***  0.0113 
Clerical 0.079***  0.0100  Clerical 0.112***  0.0099 
Craft (skilled manual)  0.158***  0.0094  Craft (skilled manual)  0.145***  0.0095 
Service occupation  0.147***  0.0153  Service occupation  0.147***  0.0142 
Sales   0.177***  0.0113  Sales   0.175***  0.0118 
Operative 0.040***  0.0093  Operative  0.012  0.0092 
Professional or managerial & 
degree 
0.145***  0.0113  Professional or managerial & 
degree 
0.111*** 0.0112 
Technical & (alevel or degree)  0.066***  0.0131  Technical & (alevel or degree)  0.060***  0.0127 
Service & (highcse or, alevel or, 
degree) 
0.051***  0.0172  Service & (highcse or, alevel or, 
degree) 
0.039** 0.0165 
Sales & low CSE  -0.107***  0.0216  Sales & low CSE  -0.063***  0.0224 
Female & skilled  0.039***  0.0086  Female & skilled  0.035***  0.0086 
Percentage of female & female  0.0007***  0.0002  Percentage of female & female  0.0004**  0.0002 
Percentage of females  -0.0021***  0.0002  Percentage of females  -0.0014***  0.0002 
Percentage of ethnic minority & 
minority 
-0.0020***  0.0007  Percentage of ethnic minority & 
minority 
-0.0016** 0.0006 
Percentage of minorities  -0.0015***  0.0005  Percentage of minorities  -0.0013***  0.0004 
Proportion part-time staff  -0.233***  0.0211  Proportion part-time staff  -0.207***  0.0232 
Proportion managerial staff  0.231***  0.0356  Proportion managerial staff  0.250***  0.0401 
Proportion professional staff  0.202***  0.0219  Proportion professional staff  0.200***  0.0231 
Proportion technical staff  0.138***  0.0265  Proportion technical staff  0.210***  0.0285 
Proportion clerical staff  0.223***  0.0207  Proportion clerical staff  0.314***  0.0228 
Proportion craft (skilled) staff   0.028  0.0253  Proportion craft (skilled) staff   0.058**  0.0237 
Proportion service staff  0.091***  0.0206  Proportion service staff  0.111***  0.0224 
Proportion sales staff  0.152***  0.0235  Proportion sales staff  0.205***  0.0253 
Proportion staff over 50  -0.215***  0.0285  Proportion staff over 50  -0.191***  0.0324 
Proportion staff under 21  -0.254***  0.0361  Proportion staff under 21  -0.317***  0.0437 
Ln(employment) 0.031***  0.0032  Ln(employment) 0.037***  0.0033 




Table A3. Semi-parametric random effects results (robust standard errors). 
Continued 
    WEEKLY PAY  HOURLY PAY 
COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR  COVARIATE  COEFFICIENT  STD ERROR 
Female & trade union density  0.005  0.0164  Female & trade union density  -0.029*  0.0164 
Minority & trade union density  0.122***  0.0427  Minority & trade union density  0.088**  0.0434 
Public sector (administration)  -0.077***  0.0166  Public sector (administration)  -0.070***  0.0184 
Female & public sector  0.035***  0.0127  Female & public sector  0.022*  0.0122 
Private sector (services)  -0.014  0.0122  Private sector (services) -0.032**  0.0139 
Part of large firm  0.045***  0.0091  Part of large firm  0.033***  0.0103 
Local product market  -0.030***  0.0089  Local product market  -0.020**  0.0090 
Highly competitive market  -0.016*  0.0085  Highly competitive market  -0.026***  0.0091 
London 0.220***  0.0127  London  0.227***  0.0134 
Rest of the South East  0.097***  0.0098  Rest of the South East  0.085***  0.0105 
West-Midlands   0.032**  0.0132  West-Midlands   0.041***  0.0148 
Scotland 0.011  0.0124  Scotland  0.034**  0.0134 
Banded total 
unemployment/vacancy rate by 
travel to work area (3%-6%) 
-0.046*** 0.0088  Banded  total 
unemployment/vacancy rate by 
travel to work area (3%-6%) 
-0.051*** 0.0096 
Banded total 
unemployment/vacancy rate by 
travel to work area (more than 7%) 
-0.078*** 0.0157  Banded  total 
unemployment/vacancy rate by 
travel to work area (more than 7%) 
-0.071*** 0.0159 
Sigma 0.251***  0.0009  Sigma  0.247***  0.0009 
-2Llog=68930.260  AIC=40.021 -2Llog=68148.0  AIC=39.568 
N=20345  N=20345 
Note: *,**,***, 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance correspondingly. The results are estimated by 
approximating equation 3,  ( ) [ ] h ih ih ih ih ih ih P E R w u u = ∈ ) , , Pr( 2 1 ξ ξ x  through a semi-parametric random 
effects finite-mixture estimator.  
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